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Abstract—Smart Grids measure energy usage in real-time and
tailor supply and delivery accordingly, in order to improve
power transmission and distribution. For the grids to operate
effectively, it is critical to collect readings from massively-
installed smart meters to control centers in an efficient and
secure manner. In this paper, we propose a secure compressed
reading scheme to address this critical issue. We observe that
our collected real-world meter data express strong temporal
correlations, indicating they are sparse in certain domains. We
adopt Compressed Sensing technique to exploit this sparsity and
design an efficient meter data transmission scheme. Our scheme
achieves substantial efficiency offered by compressed sensing,
without the need to know beforehand in which domain the meter
data are sparse. This is in contrast to traditional compressed-
sensing based scheme where such sparse-domain information is
required a priori. We then design specific dependable scheme
to work with our compressed sensing based data transmission
scheme to make our meter reading reliable and secure. We
provide performance guarantee for the correctness, efficiency,
and security of our proposed scheme. Through analysis and
simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our schemes and
compare their performance to prior arts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Grids are playing a significant role in leading the
global electrical grids revolution [1]. A recent trend is to
deploy advanced information control and communication tech-
niques in Smart Grids for better power transmission and
distribution [2]. It has attracted significant attentions from
government, industry, and academics [3].
One promising Smart Grids architecture based on wireless
has been proposed in [1][4]. Wireless broadband networks
can serve more wide-area and mission-critical utility commu-
nications due to its flexibility and high-speed transmission;
service providers always choose them to improve reliability
and resiliency during emergency scenarios. Thus, a hardened
commercial wireless data network can serve as core part
in building overall Smart Grids networks and exploit the
advantage of elastic deployment with dynamic routing.
To fully unleash such wireless-based Smart Grids’ potential
and fulfill their design objective, it is critical to collect data
adaptively in a wireless manner from smart meters installed in
millions of households with efficiency and dependability guar-
antee [5][6][7]. This critical problem has only been partially
explored recently. We present a summary of related work on
this topic in Section II.
In this paper, we provide an efficient and secure solution
to collect measurements from all smart meters in wireless-
based Smart Grids. Inspired by compressed sensing theory
[8], substantial studies [9][10][11] have been explored to
improve data transmission efficiency and it also gets applied in
Smart Grids [6]. We exploit the observed correlations among
Smart Grids meter readings and adopt the compressed sensing
technique to design an efficient transmission scheme. We also
propose protection mechanism tailored for our compressed-
sensing based reading transmission to achieve reliability and
security. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• From our collected real-world trace, we observe that
the smart meter readings demonstrate strong temporal
correlations. This indicates they are sparse in certain
(unknown) domains.
• We design an adaptive compressed-sensing based scheme
to collect data. The scheme has two salient features. First,
data collection works under arbitrary tree topologies.
Second, it works without the need to know a priori in
which domain the readings are sparse. This is in contrast
to traditional compressed-sensing based scheme where
such sparse domain information is required a priori.
Performance guarantee of our scheme is also presented.
• We design specific dependable scheme that can work
with our compressed transmission to make it reliable and
secure. Our dependable scheme considers physical link
failures, outside and semi-honest inside attacks.
• We carry out extensive numerical experiments using real-
world smart meter readings to evaluate our scheme from
transmission cost to reconstruction performance.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We review
related works in Section II. Compressed reading and recon-
struction scheme is discussed in Section IV. Corresponding de-
pendable mechanism in combination with transmission scheme
is presented in Section V. Experimental results and analysis
are shown in Section VI. Finally, we conclude our work in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Data collection problem in Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN) has received extensive studies [9]-[11]. Data trans-
mission in wireless-based Smart Grids shares many similar-
ities with WSN, such as real-time transmission and dynamic
routing; however, there’re still two primary differences. First,
Smart Grids networks is only tree topology while WSN is
arbitrary topology, specific topology allows tailored solution
design to maximize the performance. For instance, our scheme
utilizes the tree structure to specify node behaviors and reduce
2transmission cost; secondly, meter readings express specific
correlations that other WSN data might not express. We further
utilize the strong temporal relationships among readings to
improve transmission efficiency.
Emerging problem of meter data collection in Smart Grids
has attracted much attention recently. We summarize the
difference between our work and existing work in Table I.
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORK FOR READING TRANSMISSION IN
WSN AND SMART GRIDS
A B C D
Bartoli et al. [7] X Individual Data X
Li and Liu [5] X Group Summation X
Li et al. [6] X X Individual Data
C.Luo et al. [9] X Individual Data
J.Luo et al. [11][10] X Individual Data
This paper X O(M)∼O(M·N) Individual Data X
A: Security; B: Transmission Efficiency; C: Granularity of Transmission;
D: Stream Data Transmission; X means incorporated in work
Bartoli et al. [7] considered collecting individual meter
readings independently and securely. The scheme has low
transmission efficiency, since it does not explore correlation
across data and every meter measurement is transmitted inde-
pendently. Li et al. [6] further explored the correlation across
meter readings and applied compressed sensing to improve
efficiency; however, it devised centralized security mechanism
based on wireless AP and lacked reliability. Li and Liu [5]
considered secure aggregate meter data collection with homo-
morphic encryption. The scheme ensures secure transmissions
but only collects aggregated readings, while individual reading
collection is required under most scenarios. As comparison,
our scheme explores correlation across meter readings and
develop transmission solution based on compressed sensing.
Moreover, reliability and security concerns are also critical in
Smart Grids and have been considered [12][13], we also devel-
oped specific scheme to warranty security during transmission.
In recent years, compressed sensing have been explored in
both signal processing and data transmission communities due
to its high efficiency and good recovery performance [8]. In
[9], C.Luo et al. first considered efficient data transmission
using compressed sensing in WSN and acts as the baseline
scheme for our work. Then J.Luo et al. [11][10] applied
hybrid compressed sensing also in WSN data transmission
and achieve improved efficiency while failed to consider the
case under stream data over multiple time-slots. For reading
transmissions without compressed sensing, they can be easily
extended to stream data case; however, it’s non-trivial for
schemes using compressed sensing as Section IV-D explained.
Inspired by this, we develop efficient compressed reading
transmission for Smart Grids which can work under stream
reading collection. Besides security guarantee, the differences
between our scheme and [9][11] are followings: first, our
application scenario is Smart Grids; second, it achieves good
efficiency with consideration of adaptively transmission for
stream readings.
TABLE II
NOTATION LIST IN ALGORITHMS
Symbols Notations
G predefined transmission topology
V Set of transmission participating nodes
E Set of wireless links
di(t) Meter reading at time t for i ∈ V , di(t) ∈ R+
Φ Sensing Matrix
Ψ Wavelet Transform
H Switching matrix
h[X] hash function for message X
(X)K encrypt message M with key X
Ki, K
−1
i
public/private key LHU i
K, K−1 public/private key list for all LHUs
KDC public key from data collector
TS current time-stamp
III. PROBLEM SETTING
In this section we present the general setting of our depend-
able compressed reading scheme in Smart Grids networks and
describe our chief goals. First, a list of key notations are given
in Table II for both transmission and dependable mechanisms.
For Smart Grids data transmission, we consider arbitrary
tree topology as depicted in Fig. 1 where data collector is
the root. We assume time is chopped into equal-length slots
and represent Smart Grids networks as G = (V,E). V is the
set of nodes in tree. Every node, except the root, represents
a smart meter. For every node i ∈ V , we use di(t) ∈ R+
to represent its meter reading at time t. Nodes coordinate to
transmit readings from all meters, i.e., {di(t)}t for all i ∈ V ,
to the root which represents the Data Collector. E is the set of
wireless links where one node can directly communicate with
its parent. We assume that all links can transmit one message in
every slot simultaneously (through locally orthogonal channels
or properly imposed scheduler).
Fig. 1. Smart Grids Data Transmission Topology
More specifically, we regard direction towards data collector
as upstream and consider three types of nodes in Smart Grids:
• Forwarder: Legitimate Home Users (LHUs) that reside
mostly on downstream of the tree. A Forwarder first
acquires reading from attached smart-meter, then for-
wards to its parent node together with the data from its
downstream children nodes.
• Aggregator: Legitimate Home Users (LHUs) that usually
reside in the middle of the tree. An Aggregator collects
3reading from its smart-meter, aggregates it with recited
data from downstream children, and sends aggregated
data to parent. Further explanations in Section IV-C.
• Data Collector: the root node of the tree. It receives all
the readings sent from Aggregators and Forwarders, and
reconstructs original readings of all smart meters.
Detailed definitions for Forwarder and Aggregator will be
specified in Section IV-C where we introduce our compressed
reading scheme in Algorithm1.
For dependability-related issues, first we try to ensure relia-
bility with consideration of link failure; then we assume Smart
Grids data transmission being exposed to outside attackers
who can destroy transmitted readings or impersonate LHUs,
they are further explored in Section V. Smart Grids’ LHUs
are regarded as semi-honest who would passively eavesdrop
readings instead of actively tampering.
There are two objectives in designing a dependable com-
pressed reading scheme. The first objective is to use as few to-
tal number of transmissions to allow all smart meters’ reading
reconstruction up to acceptable bounded errors, i.e., {di(t)}t
for all i ∈ V at Data Collector. The second objective is to
make the transmissions dependable, by designing mechanism
tailored for the compressed transmission, we generate trouble-
free transmission topology and defend against outsiders, semi-
honest insiders.
IV. COMPRESSED READING AND RECONSTRUCTION
A. Compressed Sensing Preliminary
We first briefly review the necessary compressed sens-
ing background. In general, one needs N measurements to
fully recover an N -dimensional signal. However, for an N -
dimensional signal is sparse in certain domain, the compressed
sensing theory [8] states a rather surprising result: one can
fully recover the signal by using only Ω(logN) linear mea-
surements.
DEFINITION 1. An N -dimensional signal d is said to be K-
sparse in a domain Ψ, if there exists an N -dimensional vector
x so that d = Ψx and x has at most K non-zero entries
(K < N ).
Remarks: (i) the above definition covers the case where d is
sparse itself, for which we can simply take Ψ = I and x = d.
(ii) many natural signals are sparse in certain domain. For
example, natural images are sparse in Wavelet domain [14].
We observe meter readings are sparse in frequency domain.
Let y be an M -dimensional linear measurements of d, i.e.,
y = Φd, where Φ is an M ×N sensing matrix.
DEFINITION 2. An M ×N sensing matrix Φ is said to satisfy
a Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) of sparsity K (K < N)
if there exists a δK ∈ (0, 1) such that the following holds for
any K-sparse N -dimensional vector z:
(1− δK)||z||2l2 ≤ ||Φz||2l2 ≤ (1 + δK)||z||2l2 ,
where ‖·‖l2 represents the l2 norm.
It has been shown in [15][8][16] that an M ×N matrix Φ
satisfies RIP with probability 1−O(e−γN ) for some γ > 0 if
• all its entries are independent and identically distributed
Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variance
1/M ,
• and M ≥ const ·K · logN/K .
The following observation is due to [8]:
THEOREM 1. Consider an under-determined linear system
y = Φd where y is an M × 1 vector and d is a N × 1 vector
and is K-sparse in domain Ψ. If the M×N sensing matrix Φ
satisfies the RIP property and Ψ is orthornomal, then d can be
recovered exactly by solving the following convex optimization
problem
minx ||x||l1 (1)
s. t. y = Φd
d = Ψx.
B. Challenges and Solution Overview
Since the energy consumption habit is lasting, which indi-
cates that the meter readings have strong temporal correlation
(detailed in Section VI), thus meter readings in Smart Grids are
sparse in frequency domain. It is natural to explore compressed
sensing to reduce the number of transmissions for the data
collector to collect all the meter readings.
However, it is nontrivial to apply compressed sensing in our
problem. In particular, there are three challenges stand:
• How to generate sensing matrix Φ which satisfies RIP
in Smart Grids networks and data collector can recover
the original data using the same Φ without receiving it
directly;
• How to select sparse domain Ψ to represent the meter
readings sparsely since the readings are not sparse natu-
rally and compressed sensing deals with the signal which
is compressible in some domain;
• How to adjust Ψ adaptively to deal with a stream of data
since we need to recover a stream of data which is not
sparse in a fixed domain.
We address these three challenges and successfully design an
efficient meter reading solution based on compressed sensing.
We address the first challenge by using the pseudo-random
number generator seeded with the node’s identity. For the
second and the third challenges, we design transform domain
by using the property of piecewise polynomial signal. We
elaborate our solutions in the next two subsections.
C. Compressed Reading
In this section, we will give a transmission scheme to
address first challenge to apply compressed sensing to Smart
Grids networks.
Given Smart Grids networks G(V,E), |V | = N . Denote S
is the Data Collector. M is compressed factor defined by data
collector and data collector broadcasts it to the entire network.
We define forwarder as the node whose number of children
nodes is less than or equal to M − 1 and aggregator as the
4node whose number of children nodes is larger than M−1. For
each node i ∈ V, IDi is its identity. Ci is the set of children
nodes of node i. Fi and Ai is the set of forwarder children
nodes and set of aggregator children nodes of it respectively.
mi is the message it sends out.
We make some assumptions that are considered to be
reasonable in our scheme:
• Every LHU reports its data synchronously. Also, each
LHU should append its ID within transmitted message.
• Data Collector receives measurements periodically from
all registered LHUs; it then recovers the data and estimate
the grid state at that moment.
In Algorithm1, if there is no aggregator in the network,
then each forwarder just relays the readings from its children
nodes including its own reading to the parent node on the
tree. If not, the forwarders just work as the same way as the
previous case while each aggregator will generate weighted
sum of the readings from its forwarder children nodes and
combine with the message from its aggregator children nodes,
then reports to its parent node. Finally, the data collector will
get the measurements of all data readings for the purpose of
reconstruction of original data. It’s clear that each node reports
at most M messages in the transmission scheme. And total
cost is even less than the scheme in [9]. Due to applying
compressed sensing to the data transmission in Smart Grids,
the bottleneck and total cost of Smart Grids networks will be
significantly reduced. Detailed discussion in Section.IV-F.
Algorithm 1: Compressed Reading Algorithm
Input: [ G(V,E), S, IDi, di, ∀i ∈ V , M ]
Output: [ mi, ∀i ∈ V ]
begin
Count |Ci|, ∀i ∈ V
Generate Ai and Fi, ∀i ∈ V
if | ∪j∈V Aj | = 0 then
∀i ∈ V , mi = ∪jdj , j ∈ Ci ∪ i
else
for l = 1 to M do
if i is forwarder then
mi = ∪jdj , j ∈ Ci ∪ i
else i generates gaussian random coefficients φlj
using a pseudo-random number generator for all
j ∈ Fi ∪ i seeded with associated IDj
mi=
∑
j∈Fi
φljdj +
∑
j∈Ai
mj
S collects the weight measurement of all nodes
represented as yl =
∑N
j=1 φljdj
S can get the mathematic formulas y = Φd to
demonstrate the all measurements
D. Compressed Reconstruction
In this section, we will propose data reconstruction scheme
based on compressed sensing for Data Collector to recover
original data after collecting all M measurements using the
transmission scheme. When the network topology is known
by Data Collector, it can generate the same sensing matrix
Φ using the same pseudo-random number generator and the
same ID. However, the prerequisite of exact reconstruction
of using compressed sensing technology is that the signal is
sparse or sparse in certain domain. We propose the scheme
below to address this challenge. The objective of our scheme
is to reconstruct the meter readings of all smart meters di(t),
∀i ∈ V by Data Collector at time t. Let’s first look into the
simple case where Data Collector need to recover the static
data. After that, we will address how to deal with the stream
data.
1) Snapshot Case: In this case, We propose the algorithm
for Data Collector to reconstruct the static data d ∈ RN .
It is well known that piecewise polynomial signal is sparse
in wavelet domain [14].
PROPOSITION 1. [17] If a signal f is equal to a polynomial
of degree less than J/2 over the support of a k-level DaubJ
wavelet W km, then the k-level coefficient xm = f ·W km is zero.
Let H be the switching matrix such that the entries of Hd
is ascendingly ordered which can be regarded as piecewise
polynomial.
THEOREM 2. Given y = Φd where y is a M × 1 vector and
d is K-sparse in domain H−1Ψ. If the entries of M × N
sensing matrix Φ are independent and identically distributed
Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variance 1/M
and Ψ is wavelet domain, then Data Collector can recover d
exactly by solving the following convex optimization problem
with probability 1−O(e−γN ) for some γ > 0 if M ≥ const ·
K · logN/K
minx ||x||l1 (2)
s. t. y = Φd
d = H−1Ψx.
2) Stream Case: We have shown that how to reconstruct the
static data using the snapshot algorithm. However, for snapshot
algorithm, we assume to know the H, the switching matrix,
in advance but it is usually not known a priori in practice.
Further, instead of a snapshot, we need to recover a stream
of data {di(t)}t for all i ∈ V . We address these challenges
by designing an algorithm exploiting the temporal correlation
and our particular compressed sensing scheme as follows.
• t0: Each node is treated as forwarder and reports its data,
so the data collector can get the exact data d(t0) ∈ RN .
Data collector sorts the data as ascending order using the
switching matrix H(t0).
• ti, i=1,2,... : Use compressed reading scheme to get
weighted measurements y(ti) = Φd(ti). From snapshot
case analysis, we know d(ti) is K-sparse in H−1(ti)ψ
and can be reconstructed by solving an l1 minimization
problem. The challenge is that we don’t know H−1(ti)
before we reconstruct d(ti). Thus, data collector takes a
bold approach to construct a dˆ(ti) by solving following
5l1 minimization problem where the unknown H−1(ti) is
replaced by the available one H−1(ti−1):
minx ||x||l1 (3)
s. t. y(ti) = Φd(ti)
d(ti) = H
−1(ti−1)Ψx.
The data collector sorts the estimated data dˆ(ti) as
ascending order to get the estimated switching matrix
H(ti). The system then proceed to the i + 1th round.
The above algorithm shares a similar flavor as the
differential-coding based video coding schemes which encode
the initial frame and then only holds the changes from previous
one [18]. The difference is that, in our algorithm, reconstruc-
tion of the data in the current slot only depends on the order of
the data in the previous slot; while in the differential coding,
reconstruction of the former one depends on the values of the
latter one.
There are two issues to consider for the above algorithm.
First, how accurate is dˆ(ti) as compared to the real one d(ti)?
Second, since data collector recovers di+1 using the estimated
switching matrix H(ti) where there has already existed error.
Then, will the reconstruction error amplify into future rounds
and deteriorate?
In the next, we will bound the error and show that error
will not amplify.
THEOREM 3. Given specific δk satisfying:
(1− δK)||z||2l2 ≤ ||ΦΨz||2l2 ≤ (1 + δK)||z||2l2 ,
for any K-sparse N -dimensional vector z and definitions of Φ
and Ψ in (1). H−1 is the perturbation matrix. ||X ||kl2 denotes
the maximum l2 norm of matrix X’s arbitrary k columns sub-
matrices.
γA =
||ΦH−1Ψ− ΦΨ||kl2
||ΦΨ||kl2
, βA =
√
1 + δk√
1− δk
γ
′
A =
||ΦH−1Ψ− ΦΨ||2kl2
||ΦΨ||2kl2
, δ
′
k <
√
2
(1 + γ
′
A)
2
− 1
C =
4
√
1 + δ
′
k(1 + γ
′
A)
1− (√2 + 1)[(1 + δ′k)(1 + γ
′
A)
2 − 1]
(4)
Then, l2 norm of the difference between original readings,
d, and the recovered readings to (2), dˆ, is constrained as.
||d− dˆ||l2 ≤ CβAγA||y||l2 (5)
The proof of this theorem is included in Appendix.
Remarks: (i) Theorem 2 in [19] plays significant interme-
diate step in proving our Theorem 3; the difference is that
original theorem only bounds errors between sparse signals
while ours can restrict errors of meter readings which are
not originally sparse. (ii) at time-slot ti, we can bound the
error incurred with the estimated switching matrix by let
H−1 = H−1(ti−1)H(ti), Ψ = H
−1(ti)Ψ, d = d(ti),
y = y(ti) and dˆ is the recovered readings to (3); (iii) we
can choose the ”worst” H−1 to give the largest bound in (5),
thus error propagation can be ignored. In real Smart Grids data
transmission, we get the observation that H−1 is far better than
random perturbation, it only changes partly every two time-
slots. It is supported by real data experiments in SectionVI.
E. Increment Analysis
We have demonstrated how to quantify the propagated
error under arbitrary interval increments. Here, we consider
reasonable constraint against reading increment n(ti) from
d(ti) to d(ti+1) (i = 1, 2, ...), and propose another approach
to bound the estimation error. We find that stronger error bound
can be achieved if increment meets certain requirements.
PROPOSITION 2. If n(ti) is K-sparse in domain H−1(ti)Ψ,
then we can reconstruct d(ti+1) exactly, i=0,1,...,∞.
The proof of this proposition is included in Appendix.
In real data, the increment may not be exact K-sparse in
domain H−1(ti)Ψ. Even though, we still can give the bound
of reconstruction error when increment is approximately K-
sparse. The definition of approximately sparse is given below.
DEFINITION 3. The best K-sparse approximation dK of N -
dimensional signal d is obtained by keeping the K largest
entries of d and setting the others to zero. An N -dimensional
signal d is said to be approximately K-sparse in a domain
Ψ, if there exists an N -dimensional vector x so that d = Ψx
and ||x− xK ||l1 ≤ ε, ε is a positive constant.
PROPOSITION 3. If n(ti) is approximately K-sparse in
domain H−1(ti)Ψ. Then the estimation error ||dˆ(ti+1) −
d(ti+1)||l2 ≤ C0K−1/2ε, for i=0,1,...,∞ and some constant
C0.
The proof of this proposition is included in Appendix.
Remarks: In real data, we can observe strong correlation
between n(ti) and d(ti). Therefore, we can consider that
n(ti) and d(ti) share the same sparse domain.
F. Performance Analysis
In this part, we analyze the performance of our transmission
cost. First, the minimum and maximum transmission costs are
given.
THEOREM 4. Over any tree topology, for N LHUs using our
transmission scheme, minimum transmission cost is N while
maximum transmission cost is M(N −M/2 + 1/2).
The proof of this theorem is included in Appendix.
Then, we make transmission cost analysis against one
special case: p-array complete tree.
PROPOSITION 4. For N node p-ary complete tree transmis-
sion topology, cost in our scheme is O(N logpM).
The proof of this proposition is included in Appendix.
While for the scheme in [9], the total cost is always O(N ·
M) and our scheme achieves better performance than that.
6V. SECURE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Previous work such as [5][6][7] [20][21][22][23] considered
security in smart grids; however, they address security at data
collector through either secrets from AP or estimation of grids
state to check whether a discrepancy exists with the original,
and they assumed that each LHU does not fail. In contrast,
our scheme is a distributed solution where both aggregators
and forwarders get involved instead of merely relying on data
collector, and we consider reliability issues.
A. Reliability
To achieve reliable data transmission, we perform a diag-
nostic test to settle physical errors, such as link failures and
traffic congestion. Before data transmission, a data collector
publishes temporary transmission topology G′ : each LHU has
several outgoing links including one primary link and can
communicate through them wirelessly. During the test, each
LHU transmits test package with primary outgoing links to
verify its effectiveness: once failed or suffered serious delays,
it would broadcast link failure, enable another outgoing link as
primary and continue testing. Iteratively perform this test till
all LHUs’ primary outgoing links work. Using each node’s
primary outgoing links, we generate a ready topology G,
which will be used for reading data transmission.
B. Security
We protect data transmission from attacks launched by
either outsiders or semi-honest insiders, and our security model
is the following:
1) Insider Adversary: Corrupted LHUs can work as ma-
licious insider attackers. Following the standard assumptions
in [5][7], we assume that insider adversaries are semi-honest,
namely they execute our algorithms properly, but they want to
use received transmission data to infer other LHU’s consump-
tion behaviours. Also, insider adversaries can deny that they
have sent a particular data to the collector.
Inside adversaries do not drop or modify received packets,
and data corruptions are only caused by outside adversaries.
2) Outsider Adversary: we assume that an outsider adver-
sary has a polynomial-bounded computational capacity and
can actively launch the following attacks.
• Data privacy: the attack can evade a LHU’s privacy to
infer their consumer behaviours.
• Data Tampering: the attacker can tamper measurements
along the link to alter or forge measurement and make
data collector perform incorrect reconstruction;
• Impersonation: the attacker can imitate a LHU, send
forged data on its behalf to the collector;
• Replay: the attacker can intercept previous transmissions
and send them later in following days to cause recovery
error;
We defend attacks that can be launched by the above
adversaries as follows.
• Data Privacy: we encrypt transmitted data to hide con-
sumption behaviors. Our transmission scheme requires
that numerical calculations be performed on encrypted
data. To achieve that, we employ Paillier Crypto-system
[24], which has the following homomorphic properties:
E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) ∗ E(m2), E(φ ·m) = E(m)φ
E(φ1m1 + φ2m2) = E(m1)
φ1 ∗ E(m2)φ2 (6)
where E(m1) and E(m2) are encrypted measurements,
φ1 and φ2 are random coefficients generated by a LHU
with its ID. The Paillier scheme is a public-key crypto-
system, and therefore if measurement readings are en-
crypted with the data collector’s public key, only will the
data collector can decrypt and reconstruct the readings.
• Data Integrity: to check whether the encrypted trans-
missions get damaged, we use a cryptographic hash
function to verify data integrity. Since measurement data
in our setting is always 4 bytes long, we use SHA-
1 hash function, which produces a 160-bit output, but
we will only the first 64 bits of the hash value for our
integrity verification. This will reduce data transmission
cost, while maintaining reasonable security.
• Impersonation: We use standard digital signatures to
defend against impersonation attacks, and provide non-
repudiation. Each LHU generates a unique RSA key pair:
its private key is kept while public is published. Signature
can be generated only by LHU with legal private key
while can be verified by its public key held by others.
• Message Freshness: We use time stamp to guarantee that
each message transmitted is fresh, and thus defend against
replay attacks. Specifically, a LHU uses its private RAS
key to sign a hashed message together with its time stamp
to ensure message freshness and integrity simultaneously.
C. Integrating security with our Transmission Scheme
Our secure transmission scheme includes 3 algorithms as
follows.
Algorithm2 (notations are explained in Table II.) explains
how to validate received packet: it fails if ID doesn’t belong
to certain set or if integrity verification fails after successful
decryption.
Algorithm 2: Validation
Remark: verify the source ID and integrity of Pkt
Data: [ K, Pkt, Set, TS ]
K are public key list, Pkt with typical form, Set is ID
set, TS is fixed time-stamp
Result: [ Ans, ID, EncData ]
begin
divide Pkt into E, id and Sig from typical form
ID ← id ; EncData ← E
if ID 6∈Set or (Sig)K[ID] 6=(h[EncData], TS) then
Ans = false
else Ans = true
return Ans, ID, EncData
7Algorithm 3 is secure transmission scheme for Forwarders.
Forwarder LHUi first maintains three sets Rec P, V, and
Rec V respectively recording received packets, IDs of down-
stream neighbors, and IDs of received packets. Then, he
checks all the received packets using Validation: if passed,
put this packet and its ID into Rec P and Rec V; otherwise,
just abandon it. After verifications of all received packets,
LHUi knows whether all downstream neighbors have sent
their measurements; if not, ask LHUs in V\Rec V for resend:
perhaps suffering active tampering attacks. Finally, LHUi en-
crypts his own measurement with Paillier, makes hash values,
signs hash and time-stamp, then concatenates them to generate
new packet. He transmits packets from Rec P with its own
packet directly to predefined parent node.
Algorithm 4 is security strategy for Aggregator’s trans-
mission. Since aggregator LHUi needn’t store and forward
received packets, he only maintains sets V and Rec V. How-
ever, he should distinguish forwarders from aggregators in his
downstream neighbors and maintain their IDs in set Vf for
forwarders and Va for aggregators. Then he validates all the
received packets and make compression for encrypted message
from Paillier Crypto-system. For packets from non-aggregation
transmission, LHUi use F to store compressed value from
Vf ’s encrypted measurements as Eqn.6, the random coefficient
are generated using randGen with LHU ID. For encrypted
measurements from aggregators in Va, LHUi use A to store
new compressed value through multiplication from Eqn.6.
Then, it also reports missing IDs for resend. Finally, LHU i
encrypts its own measurement, adds with A and F to generate
new encrypted compressed reading, then produces new packet
with LHU ID, hash and signature. Since LHUi is aggregator,
he only transmits one packet to parent node.
Algorithm 3: SecureTransmission Forawrder
Remark: Secure transmission for Forwarder LHU
Data: [ i, K, K−1, TS , G, KDC ]
Result: [ Send Pkt ]
begin
1 V ← IDs of LHU[i]’s downstream neighbors in G
2 Rec V ← φ ; Rec P ← φ
3 for all received packets of LHU[i] do
4 R = Validation(K, Current Pkt, V, TS)
5 if R.Ans = true then
add R.ID to Rec V, CurrentPkt to Rec P
6 if V\Rec V 6= φ then
7 request IDs in V\Rec V for resend
8 Ei ← (Mi)KDC , New Pkt ← Ei | i | (h[Ei], TS)K−1
i
9 Send Pkt = Rec Pkt ∪ {New Pkt}
VI. EVALUATION
A. Experiments for Data Transmission
1) Settings: In transmission efficiency comparison, we gen-
erate some arbitrary tree topologies where nodes are randomly
Algorithm 4: SecureTransmission Aggregator
Remark: Secure transmission for Aggregator LHU
Data: [ i, K, K−1, t, G, KDC ]
Result: [ Send Pkt ]
Remarks
begin
1 V ← IDs of LHU[i]’s downstream neighbors in G
2 Vf /Va ← IDs of forwarders/aggregators from G
3 Rec V ← φ; F ← 1 ; A ← 1
4 for all received packets of LHU[i] do
5 R = Validation(K, CurrentPkt, V, t)
6 if R.Ans = true then
7 Rec V = Rec V ∪ {R.ID}
8 if R.ID∈Vf then
9 F = F∗(R.EncData)randGen(R.ID)
10 else A = A∗(R.EncData)
11 if V\Rec V 6= φ then
12 request IDs in V\Rec V for resend
13 New Data ← F ∗ A ∗ (randGen(i)∗m[i])KDC
14 Send Pkt ← New Data | i | (h[New Data], t)K−1
i
located with data collector at the center to simulate Smart
Grids networks, and compare with other previous schemes.
Here, we use Box-plot [25] to describe the statistical informa-
tion of transmission cost.
In performance evaluation, we use data from Stanford
Powernet open project where readings are real-time energy
consumption from household appliances [26]. We collected
readings of 128 appliances every twenty minutes over six
working days since advanced household smart meters can
report measurements at a minimum interval of 15 minutes [27].
After data preprocess of filtering invalid readings as negative
or null, we get 396 groups of data for these 128 appliances.
Each group includes data of one transmission round for 128
nodes. For simplicity, we assign each node with ID from 1 to
128. Numerical operations are under MATLAB environment.
2) Transmission Efficiency: We first generate 20 arbitrary
transmission networks as tree topology with 128 nodes and
1024 nodes respectively. Then assign each tree with specific
compressed factor M , ranging around 0.3N where N is the
number of participated nodes; our companion work [9] has
shown that M = 0.3N can achieve satisfactory recovery.
Evaluation of transmission cost is performed over 20 different
topologies given specific M each time. We choose Box-plot
to represent the information from 20 trees under specific M
and specific scheme.
We compare our cost with baseline scheme from [9] and
transmission without Compressed Sensing aggregation. As
Fig.2(a) and 2(c) show, since baseline scheme makes each
node’s outgoing link carry exact M transmission packets,
when M and N are given, transmission cost remained un-
changed under different topologies and its box-plot is sin-
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Fig. 2. Overall Transmission Comparison of 128 nodes and 1024 nodes
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Fig. 3. Reconstruction Performance of Selected Transmission Rounds
gle value. Its overall transmission cost always exceeds our
scheme upper bound. As for transmission without aggregation
operations, we found it’s more efficient than the referred
baseline scheme. This result partly comes from the fact that
tree topology spanning favors both width and depth instead
of only length where topology more resembled the chain, and
baseline scheme won more advantage.
Then compare our transmission cost with that of non-C.S.
scheme. Fig.2(b) and Fig.2(d) demonstrate the Box-plot of
their results. For each M , our scheme reduce approximate 15%
transmission cost in comparison with non-C.S. under worst
case; thus, it outperforms non-aggregation in general.
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Fig. 4. Correlation for Increment and Readings
3) Data Correlation analysis: We make analysis against
collected data and interval increment to reveal correlations.
First, we compare readings over 128 appliances at current
time slot with the previous one from round 2 and get Fig.4(a).
It represents strong correlations among the readings of every
two time-slots, almost all correlations are larger than 99.95%.
This observation demonstrates that the order of readings at
one time-slot wouldn’t change too much in the next.
Then, we compare the readings at previous time slot and
the increment between previous time slot and current one to
get Fig.4(b). We can observe that over 96.7% correlations are
larger than 0.8, which means the strong correlations among
the readings and the increments. Therefore, the increments
and readings have the similar patterns, thus share the same
sparse domain.
4) Reconstruction Performance: Since our resorted read-
ings are regarded as piecewise polynomial which can be
represented with K-sparse under wavelet domain, and we have
N equal 128 from data collection, here we choose 7-level Haar
wavelet domain for sparsity transform.
Here, we choose 7 rounds uniformly for evaluation. From
Fig.3(a) to Fig.3(g), we compare the reconstruction using our
scheme with that choosing current readings’ real order, also
original readings are incorporated. First, we witness that the
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Fig. 5. SNR between Original Order and Estimated Order
difference between reconstructions with our scheme using last
round’s estimated order and original readings don’t amplify
after 396 rounds transmissions, it can still achieve recovery up
to acceptable bounded errors; moreover, difference between
recovery with original data order and our scheme are quite
small.
According to analysis from Section IV-D, when we use
order of this round’s estimated readings to reconstruct next
ones, the errors incurred from choosing order with some
inaccuracy would always be constrained within threshold of
CβAγA||y||2. Fig.3(h) describes the L2 norm of estimation
difference between measurements with estimated order and
the original, for all 7 numerated rounds, our estimation errors
are much less than the error bounds. The bound increases
over rounds due to the increase of l2 norm of compressed
measurements y; however, because of strong correlations in
Fig.4(a), data sparsity remained well in DWT domain over
multiple rounds and contribute to reconstruction performance.
To further quantify the difference, we use SNR to evaluate
the performance of our scheme: original readings’ power as
Psignal, power of the difference between reconstructed value
and original as Pnoise, we have SNR = 10 lg(PsignalPnoise ) and
larger values represent better performance. From Fig.5, for all
396 transmission rounds, SNRs of our scheme’s reconstruction
are generally less than that of reconstruction using original
readings’ order due to incurred errors from choosing some
inaccurate order; however, we can still achieve SNR larger
than 20 all the time.
Therefore, our scheme can achieve good performance even
using last round’s estimated order; the incurred errors wouldn’t
propagate and amplify across time since strong correlations ex-
ist across readings, little perturbation of order matrix wouldn’t
degrade our performance.
B. Security Cost
Due to dependable transmission scheme in Section V, the
overall transmission cost would increase in packet size. The
useful message length would increase 13 bytes from 6 bytes
(4 for original readings, 2 for LHU ID) to 19 bytes (8 for en-
crypted readings, 2 for LHU ID, 9 for signature with hash and
time-stamp). In practice, when considering other information
required for transmission such as MAC and PHY Headers [7],
13 bytes would only occupy small part of overall transmitted
data and wouldn’t degrade our transmission performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new scheme for efficient
and secure meter reading in Smart Grids based on compressed
sensing. This is the first attempt to solve the problems of
efficiency, security and individual data transmission simulta-
neously. Our scheme works for collecting stream data, the
incurred estimation errors wouldn’t propagate over time.
We observe strong temporal correlations among real me-
ter readings which indicate their sparsity in certain domain.
Building upon this observation, we propose the compressed
reading scheme which can work over arbitrary tree topologies
and reduce total transmission cost that is needed to collect and
recover all the meter readings. In contrast to traditional CS-
based transmission scheme that requires to know the sparse
domain a prior, our scheme can recover stream data without
the knowledge of sparse domain beforehand. We prove that
the reconstruction error is bounded for every instance of the
stream data and does not drift over time. Through numerical
experiments, we observe that our scheme can reduce the
transmission cost significantly as compared to a common
benchmark [9] and the non-aggregation scheme. Due to the
strong temporal correlations among the collected real-world
data, we achieve good reconstruction performance. Mean-
while, we tailor specific security scheme to ensure reliability
and security of data transmission. Moreover, it incurs only
minor extra overhead.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Original readings d = Ψx, where x is the sparse
representation of d in domain Ψ. Solution to (2) is xˆ. Since
H−1 is blind during reconstruction in (2), we use Ψxˆ as
recovered readings dˆ. Since wavelet matrix Ψ is orthonormal,
||d− dˆ||l2=||Ψ(x− xˆ)||l2=||x− xˆ||l2
From definitions in (4) and Theorem 2 in [19], we can
directly get (5) to bound the reconstruction errors in our
scheme with Ψ, Φ, δk, y and ”worst” H−1. Since the noise
entry e equals 0, our perturbation only comes from matrix
H−1.
B. Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
Proof: Since y(ti+1) = Φd(ti+1) and y(ti) = Φd(ti),
y(ti+1)−y(ti) = Φ[d(ti+1)−d(ti)] = Φn(ti). Therefore,
the estimation error ||dˆ(ti+1) − d(ti+1)||l2 = ||d(ti) +
nˆ(ti)−d(ti)−n(ti)||l2 = ||nˆ(ti)−n(ti)||l2 , i = 0, 1, ...,∞.
Denote zˆ(ti) and z(ti) are the representation of nˆ(ti)
and n(ti) in domain H−1(ti)Ψ, respectively. ||nˆ(ti) −
n(ti)||l2 = ||H−1(ti)Ψzˆ(ti) − H−1(ti)Ψz(ti)||l2 =
||H−1(ti)Ψ(zˆ(ti) − z(ti))||l2 = ||zˆ(ti) − z(ti)||l2 .
From the Theorem 1.1 in [28], ||zˆ(ti) − z(ti)||l2 ≤
C0K
−1/2||zK(ti)− z(ti)||l1 .
• If n(ti) is K-sparse in domain H−1(ti)Ψ , then
||zK(ti) − z(ti)||l1 = 0. We can reconstruct d(ti+1)
exactly.
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Fig. 6. Maximum Transmission Cost Proof
• If n(ti) is approximatelyK-sparse in domainH−1(ti)Ψ,
||dˆ(ti+1) − d(ti+1)||l2 ≤ C0K−1/2||zK(ti) −
z(ti)||l1 ≤ C0K−1/2ε.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: Under non-C.S. scheme, number of transmitted
packets along each LHU’s outgoing link li ranges from 1 to
M while always M when using CS strategy. According to this,
overall transmitted packets
∑N
i=1 li can vary from N to N ·M
through respectively filling each link with 1 or M packets.
Minimum cost N can be achieved through broadcasting
where all N LHU directly transmits 1 packet towards collector.
However, it’s impossible to fill each link with M packets due
to assumption of tree topology where at least one leaf-LHU
exists and its outgoing link carries only one packet.
Then discuss maximization case. Assume the cost can get
maximized under topology with K leaf-LHUs in Fig.6(a).
First, we choose two neighboring LHUs i and j and find
nearest common ancestor (NCE) Q as in Fig.6(b); thus, node
Q connects only two branches i and j as downstream children.
Now we append branch i to j’s tail and consider cost change.
Since property of LHU as aggregator or forwarder depends
on its downstream nodes, property of Q and its upstream nodes
remain unchanged after appending. Thus consider change in
branch i and j (including Li and Lj) while other transmission
cost stays constant. Number of nodes in branch i and j are Ki
and Kj respectively and we classify as following three cases.
• Ki,Kj≤M -1. After appending, transmission cost in-
creases from (K2i +K2j +Ki+Kj)/2 to ((Ki +Kj)
2+
Ki +Kj)/2
• Ki ≤ M − 1, Kj ≥ M . After appending, cost changes
from KjM −M2/2+M/2+ (Ki +1)Ki/2 to KjM −
M2/2+M/2+KiM . Due to Ki ≤M −1, the cost also
increases. Similar for Ki ≥M , Kj ≤M − 1
• Ki ≥M , Kj ≥M . After appending, cost increases from
(Ki+Kj)M−(M2−M) to (Ki+Kj)M−(M2−M)/2.
When merging two neighboring branches under NCE,
number of leaf LHUs decrease by 1 and transmission cost
decreases as well. Iteratively performing this operation, overall
transmission cost keeps decreasing till one leaf LHU left.
Maximum cost can be achieved under chain topology with
only one leaf LHU and the cost is M(N −M/2 + 1/2).
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Denote N is the number of nodes except data
collector in the network; M is the number of packets trans-
mitted for each aggregator; L is the layer of the given tree and
TotalCost is the number of overall transmitted packets.
Obviously, there are pi nodes in the ith layer, thus∑L
j=0 p
j = N . Each node in the ith layer has
∑L−i
j=0 p
j − 1
children nodes. Assume L− lth layer is the first layer where
the nodes are aggregators, which means that
∑l
j=0 p
j−1 ≥M
and
∑l−1
j=0 p
j−1 < M . To this end, the nodes in the jth layer,
j = 1, 2, ..., L − l are aggregators and others are forwarders.
TotalCost of the scheme is the combination of two parts: cost
of forwarders and cost of aggregators.
TotalCost =
l−1∑
j=0
(pL−j
j∑
i=0
pi) +M
L−l∑
j=1
pj
=
1
p− 1
l−1∑
j=0
pL−j(pj+1 − 1)
+
1
p− 1Mp(p
L−l − 1)
=
1
p− 1(lp
L+1 −
L∑
j=L−l+1
pj) +M
L−l∑
j=1
pj
=
1
p− 1[lp
L+1 − 1
p− 1p
L−l+1(pl − 1)]
+
1
p− 1Mp(p
L−l − 1)
=
1
p− 1[(lp
L+1 − pL−l+1) +M(pL−l+1 − p)
= N(l − p−l) +Mp−l[N − 1− (M − 1)p]
= O(N logpM)
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